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Abstract: Public administration has always been a domestic affair fo r  EU  
Member States. However, national public administrations shall implement and 
apply EU  acquis in such a way that European citizens are able to enjoy the 
rights granted to them by the EU Treaties, irrespective o f the country which 
they are in. Given the fact that the EU relies on Member States to give effect to 
its legislation, it definitely means that the EU influences the structure, the func­
tioning o f national administrative system by general requirements and ensures 
the proper application o f  its acts by establishing different mechanism. The pa­
per first defines the role o f  administrative authorities in the execution o f EU  
policies, then categorizes and analyse the different cooperative mechanisms 
between administrative authorities which ensure the operation o f  internal mar­
ket and finally it focuses on a recent challenge o f  European administration 
caused by the fundamental rights requirements fo r  administrative authorities 
executing the acquis.
Key words: European administration, networks, fundamental rights pro­
tection, good administration 1
1. Introduction: relationship betw een national adm inistration
and the EU
Administration and administrative law in EU context generally refers only 
to the collaboration o f national and EU institutions in policy formation but its 
role in the (reshaping o f the status and structure of national administration is 
rarely emphasized.
Public administration has always been a domestic affair for EU Member 
States and harmonisation o f national administrative structures has never been 
the expressis verbis aim of the European integration. The Treaty of Lisbon was
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a milestone for introducing the expression on the relationship between the 
European Union and national administration and Article 197 o f Treaty on the 
Functioning o f the European Union (TFEU) on administrative cooperation reads 
as follows:
1. Effective implementation o f Union law by the Member States, 
which is essential fo r  the proper functioning o f the Union, shall be re­
garded as a matter o f common interest.
2. The Union may support the efforts o f  Member States to improve 
their administrative capacity to implement Union law. Such action may in­
clude facilitating the exchange o f  information and o f  civil servants as well 
as supporting training schemes. No Member State shall be obliged to avail 
itself ofsuch support. The European Parliament and the Council, acting by 
means o f  regulations in accordance with the ordinary legislative proce­
dure, shall establish the necessary measures to this end, excluding any 
harmonisation o f  the laws and regulations o f  the Member States.
3. This Article shall be without prejudice to the obligations o f  the 
Member States to implement Union law or to the prerogatives and duties 
o f  the Commission. It shall also be without prejudice to other provisions o f  
the Treaties providing fo r  administrative cooperation among the Member 
States and between them and the Union.1
Article 197 TFEU explicitly connects the proper functioning o f the EU and 
effective implementation and application o f its law; mid it implicitly links the 
achievement o f effective implementation to the administrative capacity o f 
Member States.1 2 Direct administration, the set o f EU institutions and authorities 
to execute its policy, is relatively humble and the EU rather relies on national 
administrative system as its local active hand to execute and enforce EU law 
and thereby ensure its proper implementation and application. At the same time, 
it declares that the help and support, which is specified only in the form o f  fa ­
cilitating the exchange o f  information and o f  civil servants as well as support­
ing training schemes, is not obligatory for member States but the European 
Parliament and the Council adopts the necessary legislation to obtain the aim o f  
effective execution o f  EU law without the intent to harmonise this area.
The European Union is built upon democratic States thus administrative 
justice have always been key driver for improving the effectiveness o f EU law.
1 Consolidated versions o f die Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union - Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of die European 
Union - Protocols - Annexes - Declarations annexed to the Final Act of the Intergovernmental 
Conference which adopted the Treaty of Lisbon, signed on 13 December 2007. Official Journal C 
326,26/10/2012 p. 1-390.
2 Phedon Nicolaides: Administrative Capacity for Effective Implementation o f EU Law. 
EIPA (European Institute o f Public Administration Bulletin) No 2012/01. p. 6.
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At EU level, certain common principles and rules relevant for its own adminis­
trative procedures have been developed progressively and this inevitably results 
some influence on national administrations when implementing and applying 
EU law. General requirements for the accessing States were first defined in the 
pre-accession period o f the eastern countries to help them in the transition into a 
democratic system. These rules aimed to help to improve their administrative 
capacity and to prepare for the effective execution and enforcement o f the ac­
quis o f  the EU (the former acquis communautaire)?
The European Administrative Space consists of the shared principles of 
public administration among EU Member States, the standards like reliability, 
predictability, accountability; transparency, efficiency, and effectiveness to 
which EU candidate States are expected to conform in order to align their public 
administrations -  its structure as well as the procedural issues -  to those of 
Member States. These principles are, by the way, also the basic principles for 
the functioning o f the EU institutions and bodies. However, the adaptation pe­
riod to EU standards does not finish with the declaration o f  the acceptance o f 
fancy principles, it requires the establishment o f new institutions and authori­
ties, broadening the duties and powers o f existing ones, connecting to and col­
laborating in the network o f authorities, and o f course the necessary harmonisa­
tion o f the procedural rules to achieve the same results by application o f the 
same EU norms and ensuring the same conditions to practice rights guaranteed 
by the acquis. This process is a continuous interaction not only during the pre­
accession period but also thereafter. Individuals and companies need effective 
public administrations in order to fully enjoy the rights enshrined in EU law. 
Due to this requirement, the formulation o f EU law and the improvement of 
policies necessarily entail changes and modifications in domestic administrative 
functions and sometimes in the structure, too. It seems to be a never-ending 
mechanism to achieve a level o f harmonisation even if  the text o f the Treaty 
says otherwise.
Hereby, the mechanisms shaping and connecting the national administra­
tive system is presented topped with a recent influencing force: the fundamental 
rights protection. 3
3Support for Improvement in Governance and Management in Central and Eastern Euro­
pean Countries (SIGMA) is a joint initiative of the OECD and the European Union. The initiative 
supported public administration reform efforts in thirteen countries in transition, and is principally 
financed by the European Union’s Phare Programme in order to meet EU accession requirements 
for the effective enforcement of EU law. “European Principles for Public Administration”, 
SIGMA Papers, No. 27, OECD Publishing, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5kml60zwdr7h-en 
(20.03.1015.) See also “Preparing Public Administrations for the European Administrative 
Space”, SIGMA. Papers, No. 23, OECD Publishing, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5kml6143zd8p-en 
(20.03.1015.)
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2. Cooperation between administrative authorities o f Member State 
having the same competence
The EU supports the efforts o f  Member States to improve their administra­
tive capacity to implement and apply EU law and the EU itself has established 
various mechanisms for administrative co-operation. The effective enforcement 
and execution o f  the acquis cannot always be ensured by the setting o f  common 
principles to be respected during procedures. Sometimes the implementation 
and execution requires not only adaption to procedural changes and the respect 
o f  principles but structural ones, too.
2. J. Legal institutions ‘facilitating the exchange o f  information "
Opening o f  borders and the establishment o f  integral market created situa­
tions with cross-border features which inevitably connects authorities o f  differ­
ent Member States.
The Rapid Alert System fo r  non-food dangerous products (RAPEX) was 
established to facilitate the quick exchange o f information between Member 
States and the Commission on measures taken to prevent or restrict the market­
ing or use o f products posing a serious risk to the health and safety o f  consum­
ers.4 Member States shall establish or nominate authorities competent to moni­
tor the compliance of products with the general safety requirements and arrange 
for such authorities to have and use the necessary powers to take the appropriate 
measures to ensure that products placed on the market are safe. National au­
thorities take measures to prevent or restrict the marketing or use o f  those dan­
gerous products. Both measures ordered by national authorities, involving 
modification or lifting o f  the measures or actions in question, and measures 
taken by producers and distributors are reported via the system: the authority 
shall keep the Commission informed, and the Commission shall pass on such 
information to the other Member States.5 Therefore, authorities having the same
4 Food, pharmaceutical and medical devices fell out of the scope of RAPEX as they are 
covered by other mechanisms. Any defect in a medicinal product under their authorisation that 
could result in a recall or abnormal restriction on supply shall be communicated using the Rapid 
Alert Procedure. See, Article 40 o f directive 2001/83/EC OF the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 6 November 2001 on the Community code relating to medicinal products for human 
use. OJ L 311/67, 28.11.2001, and Article 44 o f Directive 2001/82/EC of the European Parlia­
ment and of the Council of 6 November 2001 on the Community code relating to veterinary 
medicinal products. O JL 311/1,28.11.2001, The mechanism of Rapid Alert System fo r Food and 
Feed is governed by Commission Regulation No 16/2011 of 10 January 2011 laying down im­
plementing measures for the Rapid alert system for food and feed. OJ L 11/4,15.1.2002.
5 Directive 2001/95/EC of die European Parliament and of the Council of 3 December 2001 
on general product safety. OJ L 11,15.1.2002, [General Product Safety Directive (GPSD)} Article 
6. and ANNEX II. See, Stephen Weafeerill: EU Consumer Law and Policy. Edward Elgar Pub­
lishing, Cheltenham, 2013. p. 273-276.
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tasks and competences in different Member States are all aware o f the relevant 
information on products on the internal market posing a risk to other public 
interests protected by EU legislation. On the basis of the decision of the Dan­
gerous products can thus be withdrawn from the market and recalled from con­
sumers everywhere in the European Economic Area thus the same level o f EU 
law enforcement can be achieved without carrying out the same administrative 
procedure everywhere. This mechanism contributes to the activity of national 
consumer protection authority as alerts substitute for the whole procedure o f an 
official control and the decision-making. Namely, rules concerning safety of 
products under the scope o f the General Product Safety Directive shall be the 
same everywhere in the EU (and in the European Economic Area) thus in the 
particular case when a national authority declares that a product is not in con­
formity with the EU law, this decision is therefore normative for all the national 
authorities in all the Member States in which that product is on the market.
In Hungary, the Hungarian Authority fo r  Consumer Protection is re­
sponsible to cooperate in the RAPEX system. During this year, 41 alerts 
have already been shared.6 Just fo r illustration: a toy pushchair named 
’’Love Baby My Lovely” was withdrawn from the market because the 
product does not comply with the requirements o f  the Toy Safety Directive 
and the relevant European standards. In fact the safety lock and the frame 
are not sufficiently resistant to load and can easily release and break re­
spectively; causing the pushchair to collapse and thus this may cause inju­
ries to children.7
2.2. Linking national authorities fo r  a better application o fE U  law:
horizontal cooperation
TFEU sets out the aim o f  abolishing all obstacles to free movement of 
goods, persons, services and capital between the Member States to create the 
internal market.8 By the way, in 2001 White Paper on European Governance 
has already called the attention to help citizens and businesses to enjoy their 
rights created by EU law and it also affirms the responsibility o f national ad­
ministrations for enforcing and applying it correctly.9
6 Between 1st January and 17 March 2015. Source of information: RAPEX Search Notifi­
cation. http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/safety/rapex/alerts/main/index.cfm?event=main.search 
(17. 03.2015.)
7 See: Notification Reference: A11/0010/15. http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/safety/rapex/ 
alerts/main/index.cftn?event=main.notification&searchJerm-All/0010/15&exclude_search_term 
=0&search_year=2015 (17. 03.2015.)
8 TFEU Article 26 (2).
9 Communication from the Commission of 25 July 2001 "European governance - A white 
paper" COM(2001) 428 final, OJ C 287, 12.10.2001. p. 20-21.
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Horizontal cooperation o f national authorities means the procedure be­
tween national administrations or authorities aiming to solve problems related to 
the rights and obligations issuing from the four freedoms o f internal market. 
Organs are created or assigned to cooperate as a  part o f a network on behalf o f a 
citizen whose rights under EU law are breached by an authority o f  another 
Member State or by any other organs, service providers, companies which are 
obliged by the relevant EU rules. Organs o f the network forms part o f the ad­
ministrative structure o f the Member State however, they do not act with au­
thority power; their main aim is to make connection between the individual and 
the party which is alleged to breach the EU law and then mediate between them. 
The procedure serves for the correction o f misinterpretation o f EU law or its 
wrong application and avoids judicial dispute resolution. This kind o f mediation 
between the parties not only help people to exercise their rights guaranteed by 
EU law but eliminates difficulties, like distance and language, arising from the 
cross-border element. On the other hand, such mechanism also contributes to 
the proper execution o f EU law by highlighting its improper application and 
interpretation by national administrative authorities and therefore it prevents 
unnecessary court proceedings and perhaps avoids infringement procedures.
SOLVIT is such network for informal problem resolution. Originally, it 
was established by a communication from the Commission which counted on an 
existing network o f coordination centres in Member State created in 1997 to 
deal with internal market problem cases.10 It aims to help EU citizens to enjoy 
their right guaranteed by EU in the internal market when the citizen or business 
faces extra obstacles in another member State. The applicant has the right to 
launch such proceedings at any time before the national SOLVIT centre which 
then will contact the SOLVIT centre o f the Member State o f that authority 
which allegedly breached EU law. Where other effective cross-border problem­
solving mechanisms exist and are effective, SOLVIT is not intended to replace 
them, but to direct appropriate cases to those mechanisms.11
The home centre o f SOL VIT in Hungary is administered by the Minis­
ter fo r  Justice.12 A Hungarian citizen had worked fo r  20 years in Romania
10 Framework Contract for projects relating to Evaluation and Impact Assessment activities 
of Directorate General for Internal Market and Services Evaluation of SOLVIT. Final Report 
November 2011. Centre for Strategy and Evaluation Services,[SOLVIT Report of 2011] p. 3.
11 See Commission Recommendation of 7 December 2001 on principles for using 
"SOLVIT” -  the Internal Market Problem Solving Network (Text with EEA relevance) (notified 
under document number C(2001) 3901, OJ L 331 , 15.12.2001. p. 79-82. SOLVIT Report of 
2011. p. 13., Dacian C. Dragos - Bogdana Neamtu (eds.): Alternative Dispute Resolution in Euro­
pean Administrative Law. Springer, Heidelberg, 2014. p. 351-352.
12 Art. 82 (8)ce o f Government Decree No. 52/2014. (VI. 6.) on the tasks and competences 
of the Ministers; Before, the SOLVIT center was operated by the Minister of Foreign Affairs.
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and 18 in Hungary. When he applied fo r his pension in Hungary, the Hun­
garian authorities asked Romania to calculate his pension rights fo r  the 18 
years he worked there. Despite several reminders, no answer was received 
fo r  almost a year. Owing to the intervention o f the Romanian SOLVIT cen­
tre, the Romanian pension authority fu lfilled  its duty in accordance with 
the social rules o f the EU  and the problem was solved in 2 weeks.13
SOLVIT is a general mechanism, but for special fields o f  law. The Con­
sumer Protection Cooperation Network connects public authorities in all EU 
Member States (and EEA countries) who are responsible-for the enforcement o f 
EU rules for consumer protection. The network and the cooperation mechanism 
enable national consumer protection authorities to call on their counterpart in 
any o f the Member State where the trader is located and ask for action to stop 
the infringement14 The problem solving mechanism has four actors, namely (1) 
the consumer, (2) the European Consumer Céntre-(ECC) o f the State o f the 
consumer’s residence, (3) the ECC o f the State Where the enterprise is regis­
tered and (4) the foreign enterprise (registered in any E li Member State, Nor­
way, or Iceland).
The European Consumer Centre o f Hungary is hosted by the 
Hungarian Authority fo r  Consumer Protection, the central administrative 
authority o f consumer protection. A Slovakian consumer bought a machine 
fo r  household use from  a Hungarian seller which broke down more times 
within a short time. The consumer notified the enterprise that he did not 
need further repair; he wanted to exercise the right o f withdrawal and 
claimed fo r  the refund o f the purchase price. As the seller refused the 
claim, the consumer turned to the ECC and due to its intervention, the 
seller changed his mind quickly and reimbursed the purchase price after 
taking over the product.
2.3. Linking national authorities with the EU for a better execution 
o f the acquis: vertical cooperation
Vertical cooperation takes place between national administrations and EU 
institutions and agencies and means sharing o f  tasks and competences between
Article IJ6  (1) m) o f Government Decree No. 212/2010. (VII. 1.) on the tasks and competences 
of the Ministers and that of the State Secretary leading the Prime Minister’s Office.
13 See: Pension rights from different countries honoured, http://ec.europa.eu/solvit/ prob- 
lems-$olved/pension/index_en.htm (17.03.2015)
14 See, Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 o f the European Parliament and o f the Council o f 27 
October 2004 on cooperation between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of 
consumer protection laws. OJ L 364,9.12.2004, p. 1.
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the EU and national authorities. The most significant example is the shared 
competence in competition law area.15
The European Commission and the national competition authorities in all 
EU Member States cooperate with each other through the European Competi­
tion Network (ECN). Through the ECN, the competition authorities inform each 
other o f proposed decisions and take on board comments from the other compe­
tition authorities. In this way, the ECN allows the competition authorities to 
pool their experience and identify best practices but what is additional to a sim­
ple information network is the specificity o f competition rules o f the EU.16 Be­
side cooperation, exchanging evidence and other information and coordinating 
investigations via the network, the collaboration may lead to the transfer of 
tasks and competences to the better competent authority or if it is a  complicated 
case or the economic importance o f it is above the EU threshold, the Commis­
sion is entitled to take over the procedure.17
Other EU agencies are set up to promote cooperation between national au­
thorities with the leadership o f an EU institution or other kind o f  organ. Frontex, 
the European Agency fo r  the Management o f  Operational Cooperation at the 
External Borders o f the Member States o f  the European Union, for example, 
was established in 2004 to help border authorities from different EU States 
work together.18 Based on the principle o f subsidiary, each national authority is 
obliged to perform its state specific border security tasks within its territory but 
those tasks which require a centralised solution such as the training, situation 
analysis, belongs to the centrum.19 So the central body coordinates and deter­
mines tasks and the national border authorities execute them.
Hungary accessed to the Schengen area on 21 December 2007 and
became the participant o f  the Frontex.20 The system connects National
15 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the 
rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty. OJ L 1, 4.1.2003, p. 1-25.
16 loannis Lianos - Damien Geradin: Handbook on European Competition Law: Enforce­
ment and Procedure. Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, 2013. p. 182-183.
17 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the 
rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty. OJ L 1, 4.1.2003, Article 11. 
Joint Statement of the Council and the Commission on the Functioning of the Network of Compe­
tition Authorities. 15435/02 ADD 1 DG CII, points 11-19.
18 Sergio Carrera: The EU Border Management Strategy FRONTEX and the Challenges o f  
Irregular Immigration in the Canary Islands. CEPS Working Document No. 261/March 2007. 
p. 4-5.
19 Hélène Jorry: Construction o f  a European Institutional Model for Managing Operational 
Cooperation at the EU’s External Borders: Is the FRONTEX Agency a decisive step forward? 
CEPS CEPS Working Document No. 6/March2007 p. 61.
20 Report on the results of the negotiations on the accession of Cyprus, Malta, Hungary, Po­
land, the Slovak Republic, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, the Czech Republic and Slovenia to the 
European Union, prepared by the Commission's departments. See, http://ec.europa.eu/ enlarge-
578
Harmonisation of Serbian and Hungarian Law with the European Union Law
Frontex Point o f  Contacts with the Management Board o f  Frontex which is 
the central body with two representatives o f the Commission (Directorate 
General Migration and Home Affairs). In Hungary, the Hungarian Police 
Aliens Division charged with the public order and public security, the pro­
tection o f the state border, control o f  border traffic and maintenance o f  
order at the state border, an armed law enforcement administrative au­
thority, is the national contact point.21
Vertical cooperation is a complex system because it organically connects 
authorities; it concerns scope o f functions and powers. It is not only a mecha­
nism for sharing information, it goes beyond. While horizontal cooperation 
might be considered as a simple form o f  information management, vertical 
cooperation means a complete structural cooperation with a  central body and its 
local elem ents.22
3. Em erging new priorities: fundam ental law  protection shaping 
the structure o f dom estic adm inistration
Why is that a different category? Respecting fundamental rights has been 
present since long in the history o f the European integration and in its jurisdic­
tion; however fundamental rights protection has been given renewed impetus 
with the Lisbon Treaty providing binding force to the Charter o f Fundamental 
Rights o f  the European Union (Charter) and declaring the accession o f the EU 
to the European Convention on Human Rights. Since then, fundamental rights 
issues evaluated in the execution o f EU law.
Since the entry into force o f the Charter on 1 December 2009, the protec­
tion o f such rights has even evaluated as its Article 41 on the good administra­
tion23 and all the other rights guaranteed to citizens are now legally binding
ment/archives/pdf/enlargement_process/future_prospects/negotiations/eulO_bulgaria_romania/ne 
gotiations_report_to_ep_en.pdf (20.03.2015) p. 60.
21 Frontex National Authorities, http://firontex.europa.eu/partners/national-authorities/ 
(20.03.2015)
22 ReNEUAL Model Rules on EU Administrative Procedure, (eds.: Herwig C. H. Hofmann, 
Jens-Peter Schneider and Jacques Ziller et al.) Research Network on EU Administrative Law, 
2014 Version for online publication http://www.reneual.eu/publications/ReNEUAL%20Model 
%20Rules%202014/ReNEUAL-%20Model%20Rules-Compilation%20Books%20I_VI_2014-09- 
03.pdf (30.03.2015.) [ReNEUAL Model Rules] Book VI. I. (1). ”(1) Book VI applies to the 
following information management activities o f public authorities based on EU law.
(a) exchange o f information according to a structured information mechanism,
(b) exchange o f information under a duty to inform without prior request,
(c) establishment and use o f  a database. ”
23 See on this right especially: Chronowsi, Nóra: Mikor megfelelő az ügyintézés? Uniós és 
magyar alapjogvédelmi megfontolások. (When is Administration Carried out Appropriately?
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obligations addressed not only to the institutions and bodies o f the EU but also 
to the administrative authorities o f Member States when they are implementing 
and applying EU law. They shall therefore respect the rights, observe the prin­
ciples and promote the application thereof in accordance with their respective 
powers.24
Hereby, two examples are presented to highlight the influence o f funda­
mental law protection on national administration. One recent challenge is the 
data protection which requires that the compliance with the relevant rules o f  the 
Charter shall be subject to control by an independent authority.25
3.1. The structure and status o f a national administrative authority: 
data protection authorities in the view o f EU requirements
The 1995 directive on the protection o f individuals regarding the process­
ing o f personal data and the free movement o f such data was a vital instrument 
which ordered that data protection authorities must be able to act with “com­
plete independence” [Art. 28(1)]. The meaning o f complete independence was 
neither clarified, nor important for years and the characteristic o f an independ­
ent authority has just been clarified some years ago in the occasion o f two other 
infringement procedures in the same context: the independence o f the data pro­
tection authority in Germany and in Austria.
In the German infringement procedure opened in 2007 and closed in 2009 
independence was found to have been infringed by a system in which the fed­
eral state {Lander) data protection officers were subject to parliamentary over­
sight and therefore, theoretically susceptible to having their actions controlled 
by politicians.26 Two years later, in an Austrian case, independence was also 
found be infringed. The reason was the location o f data protection officer within 
the Federal Chancellery, who remains as the supreme administrative institution 
competent for the national supervisory authority, assisted by a civil service staff 
reporting up through the Federal Chancellery to a  minister.27
Considerations Related to the EU and Hungarian Protection of Fundamental Rights) Magyar Jog, 
Vol. 64. No. 3.2014. p. 137-141.
24 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ C83/389, 30.3. 2010, [Char­
ter] Article 51.
25 Charter Article 8 (3).
26 Case C-518/07, 9 March 2010. Alexander Balthasar: ‘Complete Independence’ of Na­
tional Data Protection Supervisory Authorities -  Second Try: Comments on the Judgment of the 
CJEU of 16 October 2012, C-614/10 (European Commission v. Austria), with Due Regard to its 
Previous Judgment of 9 March 2010, C-518/07 (European Commission v. Germany). Utrecht 
Law Review, Volume 9, Issue 3 (July) 2013. p. 26.
27 Case C-614/10,16 October 2012; Balthasar 26-27.
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In both cases, the any compromise of the independence o f the office was theo­
retical; concrete interference with the independence of the data protection authority 
was not alleged.28 29However, the main characteristic o f an independent authority was 
declared by the ECJ: the lack of possibility of political influence. Two more years 
later, in the case of Hungary, this criteria was violated by the re-establishment o f the 
institution of data protection in a way that a new person in charge was appointed to 
the head of the new authority by indirect political forces, while the former one was 
removed suddenly, without being able to finish his 6 year-term.
In Hungary, the ombudsman was in charge fo r  data protection at that 
time, which was appointed by a previous parliament and was mid-way 
through a six-year term in 2011 when his office was terminated and a new 
data protection authority belonging to the executive power o f the State was 
established with a new person in charge as the president o f  the authority. 
The new person responsible fo r  the representation o f data protection was 
appointed by the President o f  the Republic upon the nomination o f the
• . ■  29prime minister.
The European Court o f Justice declared this structural change incompatible 
with EU standards o f  data protection expressed in secondary sources and in the 
Charter itself. For Hungary, the judgment was rather a  notice, but in the two 
other States the structure o f the data protection authorities need to be re­
organized. Beside the fact, that for Hungary the judgment was only declarative 
upon the method of the change o f data protection model, all in all, the protection 
of the fundamental law concerning data protection gained better protection by 
the ECJ through the summarizing o f the requirements o f independence.
3.2. Administrative procedure and fundamental rights: national 
Frontex procedure and the right to make a complaint against it
In addition to the independent status o f data protection authorities, other 
fundamental right issues emerged which put a highlight on structural problems 
o f administrative authorities. In both data protection cases, internal remedy was 
available: “an alteration o f  the reporting relationships to get the data protection 
offices out from under direct political oversight.30 The administrative proce­
28 See, Kim Lane Scheppele: Making Infringement Procedures More Effective: A Comment 
on Commission v. Hungary, Case C-288/12 (8 April 2014). EUiopia law April 29 2014. 
http://eutopialaw.com/2014/04/29/making-infringement-procedures-more-effective-a-comment- 
on-commission-v-hungaiy-case-c-28812-8-april-2014-grand-chamber/(20.03.2015)
29Article 40 (1) of Act CXII of 2011 on the Right of Informational Self-Determination and 
on Freedom of Information (Info Act).
30 Scheppele: supra.
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dure o f the data protection authority in Hungary is at one level, only the judicial 
supervision o f the decision is available; there is no appeal in the organization of 
the public administration system, there is no internal remedy only external, 
judicial one is available according to the general rules o f procedures.31 Recently, 
a similar problem has occurred in the structure o f the integrated information 
exchange mechanism. In fact, the EU Ombudsman, the supervisor o f the EU 
administration,32 conducted an investigation into the compliance o f Frontex 
with human rights obligations under Regulation 1168/2011/EU and the Euro­
pean Charter. It criticised Frontex for not establishing an internal complaints 
mechanism to deal with alleged individual fundamental rights breaches in the 
course o f its work. Frontex has decided not to rectify this, arguing that hearing 
individual complaints is the obligation o f the relevant individual Member State 
whose officer was in charge when the decision in question was taken.33
Regulation 1168/2011/EU explicitly provides that it shall fulfil its 
tasks in fu ll compliance with the Charter o f  Fundamental Rights and re­
quires Frontex to put in place certain administrative mechanisms and in­
struments to promote and monitor compliance with its obligations as re­
gards respect fo r  fundamental rights. As to the possibility ofproviding for  
a complaints mechanism fo r  persons affected by its activities, Frontex 
pointed out that, first, it has no executive power and second, its task is only 
to coordinate the cooperation o f  the EU Member States and the Schengen 
Area, the executive power is vested in Member State authorities so only 
they can perform activities which may affect individuals' rights. As Frontex 
sees, persons claiming that their rights have been violated by these au­
thorities may therefore make use o f both national and EU mechanisms to 
file a complaint. 34
31 Info Act Article 22. (1) See, Kim Lane Scheppele: Making Infringement Procedures 
More Effective: A Comment on Commission v. Hungary, Case C-288/12 (8 April 2014). EUtopia 
law April 29 2014. http://eutopialaw.com/2014/04/29/making-inffingement-procedures-more- 
effective-a-comment-on-commission-v-hungaiy-case-c-28812-8-april-20I4-grand- 
chamber/(20.03.2015)
32 See in details: Linda C. Reif: The Ombudsman, Good Governance, and the International 
Human Rights System. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2004. p. 373-375.
33 European Ombudsman Special Report to the European Parliament concerning Frontex re­
fusal to introduce an internal complaints mechanism, http://www.asylumlawdatabase.eu/ 
en/content/european-ombudsman-special-report-european-parliament-conceming-frontex-refusal- 
introduce (20.03.2015)
34 Decision of the European Ombudsman closing own-initiative inquiry OI/5/2012/BEH- 
MHZ concerning the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the 
External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (Frontex) 12 Nov 
2013.[Ombudsman decision 2013] point 22. http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/cases/ deci- 
sion.faces/en/52477/html.bookmark (20.03.2015.)
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Nevertheless, Frontex provides for internal procedures allowing for indi­
viduals to inform it o f possible infringements o f fundamental rights. First, there 
is a reporting obligation imposed on participants in Frontex activities; second, 
there is an incident reporting system, and third, a new standard operating proce­
dure is established requiring full consideration o f reports, from any source and 
submitted via any means, o f possible fundamental rights violations in Frontex 
coordinated activities.35 The Frontex also submitted that their Fundamental 
Rights Officer (FRO) is an independent staff member who reports directly to the 
Management Board and performs a monitoring role. Fundamental rights protec­
tion is therefore continuously verified.36
The Ombudsman suggested that reporting obligations and complaints 
mechanisms are not alternatives; they are just complementary means to guaran­
tee the effective protection o f fundamental rights.37 The Ombudsman suggested 
FRO considering dealing with individual complaints about fundamental rights 
infringements.
As fo r  fundamental rights infringements, there are three scenarios. 
(1) When it is committed by officers who are not sta ff members o f Frontex, 
including guest officers who act under the responsibility o f  the relevant 
Member States but wear a Frontex armlet, Frontex could not deal with the 
substance. However, it could assist complainants by forwarding com­
plaints rapidly to the competent authority o f  the Member State(s) con­
cerned, such as, fo r  instance, national Ombudsmen.38 Handling complaints 
by the FRO could mean, at least, transferring the complaints to the compe­
tent Member State authority or to a national ombudsman supervising that 
authority. In this respect, the Ombudsman noted that a monitoring mecha­
nism fo r  fundamental rights breaches should be established at the EU  
level. (2) When it is due to the Frontex's staff, the Ombudsman could ac­
cept that they are deployed fo r  coordination tasks only, but this could not 
absolve Frontex from responsibility fo r  acts performed by its staff in exer­
cising their coordination role.39 For their conducts, Frontex must take re­
35 Decision of the European Ombudsman closing own-initiative inquiry OI/5/2012/BEH- 
MHZ concerning the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the 
External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (Frontex) 12 Nov 
2013.[Ombudsman decision 2013] point 22. http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/cases/ deci- 
sion.faces/en/52477/html.bookmark (20.03.2015.)
36 Ombudsman decision 2013 point 27.
37 Special Report of the European Ombudsman in own-initiative inquiry 01/5/2012/BEH- 
MHZ concerning Frontex . http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/cases/specialreport.faces/ 
en/52465/html.bookmark (20.03.2015.) 12 Nov 2013, [Special Report of the European Ombuds­
man] point 23.
38 Special Report of the European Ombudsman point 39.
39 Special Report of the European Ombudsman points 28-29.
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sponsibility.40 (3) When the complaint is about the organisation, execution 
or consequences o f  a joint operation, which do not refer to the conduct o f 
specific individuals, the procedure depends on the specific complaint. In 
all cases, Frontex is in a better position than the potential complainant to 
identify who should have responsibility fo r  answering on the substance o f 
the complaint. For such cases, Frontex has already undertook to promote 
a swift processing o f potential complaints lodged by migrants with the re­
spective Member State authorities in the course o f joint operations41
The Ombudsman considered that the broad mandate o f  FRO would allow 
Frontex to entrust the FRO with the power to deal with individual complaints 
and the fact that the FRO has no executive powers as such certainly does not 
stand in the way o f dealing with complaints.42 Nevertheless, in order to fulfil its 
fundamental rights responsibilities in accordance with principles of good 
administration articulated in Article 41 o f the Charter, Frontex should establish 
a complaints mechanism.43
During the procedure, Frontex took efforts to clarify the disputed parts of 
its Fundamental Rights Strategy and Code o f Conducts, and the Ombudsman 
declared that Frontex had adequately addressed the Ombudsman's recommen­
dations except for one. Regarding the effective complaint mechanism the 
Ombudsman stated again that reporting obligations and complaints mecha­
nisms are not alternatives. “They constitute rather complementary means to 
guarantee the effective protection o f  fundamental rights. In the Ombudsman's 
view, without the latter, compliance cannot ultimately be effective.’,44 In con­
nection with the recommendation stating that Frontex could consider taking 
the following further action as regards the FRO il 45(i) taking any possible action 
to enable the FRO to consider dealing with complaints on infringements o f  
fundamental rights in all Frontex activities submitted by persons individually 
affected by the infringements and also in the public interest, and (ii) providing 
adequate administrative support fo r  that”, the Ombudsman made a special 
report to Parliament.46
40 Special Report of the European Ombudsman point 38.
41 Special Report of the European Ombudsman points 38-39.
42 Special Report of the European Ombudsman points 47-48.
43 Special Report of the European Ombudsman point 51.
44 Decision of the European Ombudsman closing own-initiative inquiry OI/5/2012/BEH- 
MHZ concerning the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the 
External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (Frontex) 
http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/hu/cases/decision.faces (20.03.2015) [Decision of the Euro­
pean Ombudsman closing own-initiative inquiry] p. 86-138. point F. Conclusion
45 Decision of the European Ombudsman closing own-initiative inquiry point M.
46 Presentation by the European Ombudsman, Emily O'Reilly, to Committee on Petitions, 
European Parliament, of the Special Report following own-initiative inquiry OI/5/2012/BEH-
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4. Future challenges in the view  o f fundam ental rights
Even the future procedural code o f the EU administration emphasizes the 
necessity o f the proper guarantee o f procedural rights. It recognize the right of 
the parties, without prejudice to the existing legal remedies, “*? file  a complaint 
against the responsible official, the deciding authority, or any other official who 
takes part in the procedure where they fa il to comply with their obligations 
under the model rules, whether intentionally or through negligence.”47 Given 
the fact that this requirement has already been reinforced by the Court of Jus­
tice’48 and thus the Model Rules only codifies it. Following the example o f the 
Frontex, all collaboration mechanism between EU institutions and agencies 
(direct administration) and national authorities (indirect administration) could 
be supervised systematically in the view o f compatibility o f fundamental rights 
and whether the structure o f  authorities or the procedural rules o f  cooperative 
mechanisms, in summary, the execution o f the EU acquit is in conformity with 
the fundamental values.
The inquiry o f the Ombudsman highlighted a significant influence o f  fun­
damental rights on the status o f administration. Principles o f administrative law 
can also be classified as procedural human rights that guarantee fairness and 
administrative justice.49 The execution o f EU tasks and competences so as the 
cooperation o f direct and indirect administration is now facing a new challenge. 
Fundamental rights protection has gained legal force by the Lisbon Treaty and
MHZ concerning FRONTEX. Brussels, 26 November 2013. http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu 
/en/activities/speech.faces/en/52654/html.bookmark (20.03.2015) Report in accordance with 
Article 3. 7. of Decision of the European Parliament on the regulations and general conditions 
governing the performance of the Ombudsman's duties. Adopted by Parliament on 9 March 1994 
(OJ L 113,4.5.1994, p. 15) and amended by its decisions of 14 March 2002 (OJ L 92,9.4.2002, p. 
13) and 18 June 2008 (OJ L 189, 17.7.2008, p. 25. Reif: supra, p. 377.
47 ReNeual Model Rules, Book III-8 Management of procedures and procedural rights
48 Cases cited by the ReNEUAL Model Rules p. 107-108.: Ley 30/1992, de 26 de noviem­
bre, de Régimen Jurídico de las Administraciones Públicas y del Procedimiento Administrativo 
Común (BOE núm. 285, de 27.11.1992), modificada por última vez por la Ley 27/2013, de 27 de 
diciembre, de racionalización y sostenibilidad de la Administración Local (BOE núm. 312, de 
30.12.2013), Arts 35(j), 41(2); Council of Europe Recommendation CM/Rec(2007)7 of the 
Committee of Ministers to member states on good administration, Art 23(4). The material liability 
standard is taken from Regulation 31 (EEC), 11 (EAEC), laying down the Staff Regulations of 
Officials and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Economic Com­
munity and the European Atomic Energy Community (‘Staff Regulations’) [1962] OJ 45 last 
amended by Regulation (EU, Euratom) 1023/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 22 October 2013 amending the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union and the 
Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Union [2013] OJ L287/15, Art 
86(1) on disciplinary liability of EU officials.
49 Reif: supra, p. 380.
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got a new place in the legal order of the EU. Although the jurisdiction o f the EU 
has always put emphasize on respecting the common fundamental values of 
Member States but now, with a reloaded impetus, fundamental rights protection 
predicts important implications for both direct and indirect administrative struc­
ture o f  the EU and that is why the meaning o f Article 197 o f TFEU needs to be 
interpreted in the view o f a  continuous shaping mechanism caused by the non­
stop development o f  the EU itself.
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Az EU jog hatása a nemzeti közigazgatásra különös tekintettel 
az alapjogvédelemben megtestesült új kihívásra
Összefoglalás: A közigazgatás mindig is a tagállamok hatáskörébe tartozó 
terület volt, ugyanakkor a nemzeti közigazgatásnak olyan módon kell az uniós 
jogot érvényre juttatni, hogy az európai polgárok bármelyik tagállamban ugyan­
olyan eredménnyel gyakorolhassák az EU által garantált jogaikat. Tekintettel 
arra, hogy az EUjoganyaga a tagállami közigazgatási struktúrára támaszkodva 
érvényesül, ez egyúttal azt is jelenti, hogy az Unió a nemzeti közigazgatás 
szervezetét és működését általános elvárások révén befolyásolja, valamint a 
joganyagának megfelelő érvényesítése, végrehajtása érdekében különböző 
mechanizmusokat dolgoz ki. A tanulmány először a tagállami közigazgatási 
hatóságok EU jog  végrehajtásában játszott szerepéről szól, majd kategorizálja 
és elemzi azok különböző, belső piacot körülfonó együttműködési mechaniz­
musait, végül pedig az alapjogvédelemben megtestesült legújabb kihívásokat 
mutatja be, amelyekkel a tagállami közigazgatási hatóság az uniós jog  
érvényesítése és végrehajtása vonatkozásában szembesülnek.
Kulcsszavak: európai közigazgatás, hálózatok, alapjogvédelem, jó  közi­
gazgatás
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Jjp Epotceőeüt Haxwioiu, adjynxüi 
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Tlpaenu (pctKyjiiüeiű 
e-mail: csatlós. e@juris. u-szeged. hu
YTimaj npaBa EBponcKe yHiije Ha jaBHy ynpasy  y ^p^aBaMa 
HJiaHHuaMa, c noceÖHHM ocbptom Ha H3a30Be y ue3H ca 
3auixHTOM JbyACKHx npaBa h cjioőoaa
Caotceman: Jaena yüpaea ce oöyeex CMaiüpana oőjiaiuhy xoja cüada y  
nadneotcnociü dpotcaea HJianutfa Eepoücxe ynuje. Metyyühm, opianu yüpaee y  
dpotcaeaMa nnanuifOMa UMajy oőaee3y da KOMynuiüapno üpaeo üpuMewyjy na 
OHaj nanun, koJu OMoiyhaea ipaJ)anima Ynuje ociüeapueatbe ceojux üpaea, 
Tapanmoeauux KOMynuiüapHUM üpaeoM, ca udenüimHUM üpaemm 
üocjiedutfaMa y  6uno xojoj dpotcaeu njianutfu. C oŐ3upoM na íüo da ce 
KOMynuiüapno üpaeo ociüeapyje ys üoMoh jaene yüpaee y  dpotcaeaMa 
HJianuifOMa, Yuuja naciüoju da üymeM nanennux oneKueawa yiüm e na 
opianu3ai{ujy u dejiamnociü jaene yüpaee y  dpotcaeaMa mianui^cma u paeeuja 
pa3JiUHUÜie üpaene MexanusMe Kojima ce üocmuotce 3adoeo/baeajyha üpimena 
KOMynutüapnoi üpaea y  dpotcaeaMa nnanuijaMa. Y  pady ce najüpe pa3MaüXpa 
ynoia natfuonajinux opíana jaene yüpaee y  üpuMenu KOMynumapnoi üpaea. 
Haxon iüoia ce epmu Kaiüéíopu3ai\uja u ananu3a pasnuHuiüux MexanmaMa 
capadtbe, Kojima ce üXeotcu 3aiumumu ynyiüpaiutbéí iüpotcuuima. Ha xpajy 
pada daje ce üpuxa3 najnoeujux u3a3oea y  ee3u ca 3auiiüuiüOM jbydcKux üpaea 
u aioŐoda, ca KojuMa ce opianu jaene yüpaee y  dpotcaeaMa HJianuijaMa 
cyonaeajy üpunuKOM ociüeapueatba u üptmene KOMynuiüapnoi üpaea.
JObynue peuu: eepoücm jaena yüpaea, Mpeotce capadtbe, 3aiuiüuiüa 
JbydcKux üpaea u cnoőoda, doŐpa yüpaea
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